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ABSTRACT 
Soon after  the disintegration of  the USSR, Turkey attempted to take 
place at the heart of  the emerging energy regime of  the Caspian by becoming 
an energy corridor that could ünite the Caspian with the World markets. 
Nevertheless, Russia and Iran started to become profitable  associates not only 
for  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan but also for  the multinational 
companies. In 2003, it became explicit that Turkey's common projects with 
Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan were either canceled or postponed. Turkey is 
likely to realize Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project and Baku-Erzurum 
gas pipeline project. Turkey needs to develop a multilateral cooperation 
vvhich includes Russia and other littoral states of  the Caspian. Otherwise, 
Turkey's role in the Caspian region will be limited by bilateral relations with 
Azerbaijan. 
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Introduction 
The disintegration of  the former  Union of  Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in 1991 introduced Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Türkmenistan (AKT) as the new hydrocarbon producers of  the 
Caspian Sea. These three republics had once been important 
producers of  hydrocarbons during the Soviet era until the exhaustion 
of  onshore reserves in the first  half  of  1980s. Soon after  gaining their 
independence, the exploration activities of  multinational companies 
indicated that there were rich reserves of  hydrocarbons in deeper 
sections of  the Caspian, which remained undiscovered by the Soviet 
authorities because of  technological inferiority  of  the Soviet 
petroleum industry. 
Currently it is estimated that the hydrocarbon reserves of 
Caspian may reach 200 billion barrels of  oil and 337 trillion cubic 
feet  of  gas. The proven reserves of  Caspian constitute 3 percent of  the 
total World supply which amounts to 25 percent of  those of  Middle 
East.l These figures  indicate that Caspian has already become a 
significant  region for  the interaction between energy demand and 
supply. Despite the legal status of  the Caspian is stili an uncertain 
issue, the de  facto  situation indicates that AKT possess most of  the 
Caspian reserves. The oil reserves are between 31 and 40 billion 
barrels in Azerbaijan, between 95 and 103 billion barrels in 
Kazakhstan and about 34 billion barrels in Türkmenistan. Azerbaijan 
has about 35 trillion cubic feet  (Tef)  gas while the gas reserves of 
Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan are 88Tcf  and 159 Tef  r e s p e c t i v e l y . 2 
In other words, 88 percent of  oil and 83 percent of  natural gas of  the 
Caspian region belong to AKT. 
Knowing the economic importance of  this region, many 
multinational companies involved in various consortia in order to 
explore, produce, transport and commercialize the Caspian 
hydrocarbons. Despite their common legacy, AKT started to differ 
not only from  other post-Soviet republics, but also from  each other by 
their distinet responses to the external pressures related to oil and gas. 
1United  States,  Energy Information  Administration, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html. 
2Ibid. 
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These responses varied in terms of  production and transportation. 
With regard to production, the multinational oil companies became 
significant  partners who held technology, know-how and vertical 
integration. Consequently, 24 significant  projects were vitalized 
through Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and Joint Ventures 
(JVs) in Azerbaijan.3 Kazakhstan moved faster  than Azerbaijan and 
attracted many multinational oil companies both by the virtue of  its 
rich hydrocarbon reserves as well as by the help of  its liberalization 
efforts.  The result was vitalization of  46 projects.4 Despite its low 
rate of  liberalization and Turkmenbashi's nationalistic approach, 
31- The mega Project of  Azerbaijan International Operating Company 
(AIOC): Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli 2- Shah Deniz Project 3- Kursangi-
Garabaghli 4- Abikh - Alov, Araz and Sharg 5-Ashrafi  Dan Ulduz ; North 
Absheron Operating Company (NAOC) 6- Kur Dashi in the fields  of 
Neftchala,  Khilli and Babazanan 7- Lenkoran Deniz and Talysh Deniz 8-
Muradkhanli 9- Yalama (D-222) 10- The Karabakh Field Caspian 
International Petroleum Company (CIPCO) 11- Karadağ, Kergez and 
Umbaki (West Absheron) 12- Absheron (formerly  Tagiyev) 13- Oğuz 14-
Nakhcivan 15- South East Gobustan 16- inam 17- Atashgah 18- Zafer-
Mashal 19- Lerik 20- Padar 21- Kalamaddin-Mishovdagh 22- Zigh-Hovsan 
23- Ramany, Balkhany and Sabunchi 24- Kyurovdag, Shirvanoil JV. 
41- Tengizchevroil (TCO) 2- Karachaganak (Karachaganak Petroleum 
Operating Company) 3- Kashagan (Offshore  Kazakhstan International 
Operating Company - OKIOC) 4- Uralsk, Aktubinski Atirau and Aktau 
(Kazakturkmunai JV and TEPCO LLC) 5- Federovskeye 6- Adaiski (FIOC 
- Rosneft)  7- Sagiski (FIOC - Falcon Energy Overseas) 8 - Begaidar (FIOC 
- Potential Oil) 9- Mangystau 10- Nationas Energy in Karazhanbas 11-
Saigak (Maersk - Veba Oil & Gas) 12- Kyzylov (Atlantic Caspian 
Resources PLC) 13- Akshabulak, Nuraly, Aksai (Kazgermunai) 14- Aktobe 
Preussag in the fields  of  Zharkamys 15- Anako 16- Arman 17- Üzen 
(Uzenmunaigaz).18- Aktobe (CNPC - Aktobemunaigaz) 19- Demunai 20-
Embavedoil Onshore 21- Gyural, (Urals Trading) 22- Hurricane-Kumkol 
23- Karakudukmunai JV 24- KazakhOil-Telf  25- Kara-Arna 
(Kazpromstavba) 26- Atyrau 27- Kumkol-Lukoil 28- Matin, Matoil S.A. 29-
Svetlandoil JV 30- Tasbulat (Tasbulat Oil) 31- Tenge 32- Turan 33-
Zhetbay-Quest 34- American International Petroleum Corporation in the gas 
fields  of  Shagyrly-Shomyshty 35- Ertismunai 36- Mertvyi Kultuk PSA / 
Ostrovnaya 37- Munai NPT 38- Temir APP 39- Aktobe (Tulparmunai) 40-
Mangystau 41- Aktobe (BP-TPAO) 42- Chinese petroleum Corporation in 
the fields  of  AKJT 43- Pavlodar 44-Aral 45- JNOC 46- Sazankurak. 
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Türkmenistan became another area of  interest for  multinational 
companies.5 
The transportation phase was more complex. The multinational 
companies and AKT searched for  profitable  ways to transport the 
Caspian hydrocarbons to world markets. During the first  years of 
their independence, ali of  these republics stumbled betvveen loyalty to 
their Soviet heritage reincarnated by Russia and cooperation with 
alternative powers such as the United States supported Turkey and 
Iran. Consequently, AKT started to dispute with Russia about 
commercializing their hydrocarbons at the World markets. There 
were two factors,  which forced  AKT to search for  new trade 
associates outside the ex-Soviet zone. First of  ali, the dependence of 
AKT on the Gazprom's transportation system was allowing Russia 
not only to charge high transportation tariffs  but also sustain its 
domination över the Caspian region. Secondly, the most significant 
buyers of  Caspian gas, that is to say Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia and Byelorussia were not making regular payments despite 
the oil and gas prices were cheaper than anywhere else. The financial 
problems of  these countries and the barter system were impeding the 
cash flow  from  the buyers tovvards the producers. 
To the extent that the routes tovvards China, Afghanistan  and 
Pakistan were characterized by political instability, AKT did not 
prefer  these lines which necessitated huge investments. As a matter of 
fact,  AKT became very ardent about cooperating with multinational 
companies and countries other than Russia (mainly Turkey and Iran) 
in order to reach the world markets. At first  sight, Turkey seemed to 
be a very rational partner, which could offer  AKT the chance to reach 
the world markets by decreasing their dependence on Russia. 
Furthermore, Turkey had advantages against Iran that was suffering 
from  the isolation policy of  the United States. Despite its initiatives to 
vitalize oil and gas projects, which could ünite AKT with World 
51- Nebitdag (The fields  of  Burun): ExxonMobil 40% ; Lasmo 35% ; Burren 
Energy 25% 2- Garashsyzlyk-2 (Barsa-Gelmes, Ekizak, Kordekli, Cheleken, 
Guichzhik, and Kotur Tepe) MEPTI 52.4 % ; Lasmo 27.6 % ; Turkmenneft 
20 % 3- Dragon Oil, Cheleken 4- Larmag, Cheleken 5-ExxonMobil, in Amu 
Darya 6- Shell, the right bassin of  Amu Darya 7- Bridas, the fields  of 
Keimir, Ekpatlaukh and Chikishlyar. 
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markets, Turkey could sustain good relations only with Azerbaijan in 
terms of  pipeline politics. That is to say, Turkey's relations with 
Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan did not develop as much as it could 
have been. Consequently, Russia managed to cooperate with 
multinational companies by the virtue of  its existing pipelines, ports, 
facilities  as well as its political influence  in the region. Companies 
such as BP, ExxonMobil and Chevron did not underestimate existing 
Russian transportation system, which offered  transportation with low 
costs through amendments of  the existing transportation system. 
Meanwhile, it became explicit that Iran was a reasonable trade 
partner both for  multinationals and AKT by the opportunities offered 
by existing pipelines, ports and swapping. Indeed both multinational 
companies and AKT started to swap with Iran despite the embargo. 
When Turkey's interpretation of  the region is concerned, a sort 
of  unexpectedness may be easily discerned. In other words, Turkey 
had failed  to implicate a sound plan, which could increase its 
relations with these countries. Putting emphasis on ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious affiliations,  Turkish foreign  policy did not 
consider the historic and economic realities of  the region. 
Furthermore, Turkey could not start a multilateral approach, which 
could involve AKT in terms of  realization of  transportation projects. 
Consequently, each of  these republics became competitors, which 
were looking for  new markets. Having not realized these policies, (or 
having ignored them?) Turkey involved in natural gas agreements 
with Russia and Iran, which explicitly meant that it would not need 
gas agreements with Türkmenistan. As a matter of  fact,  Turkey lost 
the chance to vitalize common transportation projects, which could 
promote cooperation among AKT, Russia and Iran on the one hand, 
while promoting its national interests on the other. 
The year 2003 will be remembered by the incidents, which 
proved that Turkey's inconsistent policies were the outcomes of 
short-term cost/profit  analysis shaped by fraud  rather than a long-term 
policy option favoring  national interests. This article suggests that 
Turkey stili has the chance to reconstruct its pipelines politics with 
Caspian littoral states on mutually more profitable  basis if  it manages 
to vitalize Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline 
simultaneously by not ignoring the significance  of  Kazakhstan and 
Türkmenistan. First of  ali, Baku-Ceyhan oil and Baku-Erzurum gas 
pipelines are the two concrete projects left  for  Turkey. The 
6 THE TURKİSH YEARBOOK [VOL. XXXIV 
simultaneous construction of  these pipelines may decrease the 
investment costs. Secondly, the discovery of  new reserves in 
Kashagan and Karachaganak allovved Kazakhstan to supply certain 
amount of  oil to Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Within this sense Kazakhstan 
may involve in cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey after  the 
construction of  Baku-Ceyhan. Finally, rather than vvaiting the 
vitalization of  a Trans-Caspian pipeline Turkey should first  lead to 
construction of  Baku-Erzurum, then convince Türkmenistan to take 
part in Trans-Caspian pipeline, which may also be considered along 
with Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline.6 Despite the vital significance  of 
these projects Turkey seems to neglect its strategic interests in 
Azerbaijan by its complete attention on the Middle Eastern politics 
intensified  after  the intervention of  the US. Meanwhile Haidar Aliyev 
has been replaced by his son ilham Aliyev. This replacement may 
lead to drastic consequences if  the opposition in Azerbaijan does not 
prefer  to accept the election results. In other words, Turkey may lose 
its last chance left  in Caspian transportation projects if  it neglects its 
relations vvith Azerbaijan. 
Within this context this article will elaborate the missing 
opportunities, growing challenges and the possibilities to reconstruct 
a comprehensive pipeline politics in terms of  Turkey's options. 
Therefore,  the pipeline politics in Caspian region deserves a further 
scrutiny which may give an idea about the threats that challenges 
Turkey's role vis-â-vis Caspian region, its energy dependence and as 
well as the opportunities that it may attain in the near future. 
Oil Transportation 
Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), that 
operates Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli oil fields,  developed four 
alternatives in order to reach the world markets. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, 
6This possibility may occur in three ways: 1- If  European countries such as 
Greece agrees to buy gas from  the Caspian 2- If  Turkey's natural gas 
agreements are reconsidered 3- If  Turkey's domestic gas demand increases 
unexpectedly. The first  option tends to work on behalf  of  the ali of  the 
parties vvhile the second one necessarily changes Turkey's relation vvith gas 
suppliers. The third option is not realistic because such an increase in 
domestic demand does not seem possible. 
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Baku-Supsa, Baku Novorossisk and Baku-Chechnia-Novorossisk. At 
first  it seemed as if  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the other three options 
were mutually exclusive. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which has been 
declared on November 1999 by a coramon declaration of  Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkey, has a strategic significance  for  the US, who 
want to impede the rise of  Russia and Iran as the dominant powers of 
the region. In addition, this üne is very important for  Turkey, who 
wants to become a regional power.7 
Table 1- Transportation Projects for  Caspian Oil 
Name of  the Project 
(Oil) Destination Crude Capacity Leııgth Investment Status 
(b/d) (km) (dollars) 
AIOC Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Turkey 1 million 1,726 
2.4-3.4 billion Agreement 1999 
AIOC Baku-Supsa Georgia 0.115-0.21 million 880 590 million Active since 1999 
AIOC Baku Novorossisk Russia 0.3 million 1,397 600 million Active since 1997 
AIOC Chechnia-
Novorossisk Russia 
0.12-0.16 
million 
328+ 
railroad 140 million Active since 2000 
Baku-Tebriz Pipeline Iran 0.2 - 0.4 Unclear 500 million Proposal 
Khasuri-Batumi Georgia 70,000 - 140,000 232 70- 100 million Agreement 1999 
Gardabani-Batumi Georgia 
Renovation of 
existing line 
CPC Tengiz-
Novorossisk 
Kazakhstan-
Russia 0.56- 1.34 1,500 6.6 billion 
Phase 12001 
Peak 2010 
Tıans-Caspian Aktau-
Baku (Ceyhan) 
Kazakhstan -
Azerbaijan Unclear 595 2 billion Feasibility 1998 
Aktuibinsk - Xinjiang Kazakhstan-China 0.4 - 0.8 2,880 3 - 3.5 billion Feasibility 1999 
Central Asia Pipeline Kazakhstan -Pakistan 1 million 1,650 2.5 - 3 billion Memorandum 
Atyrau-Samara Kazakhstan -Russia 
0.21 -0.31 
million 695 37.5 million 
Upgrading started 
in 1999 
KTI 
Kazkhstan-
Turkmenistan-
Iran 
0 . 5 - 1 1,496 1.2- 1.6 billion Proposal 
Neka-Teheran Oil 
Swap line 
Türkmenistan -
Iranian Port of 
Neka - Teheran 
370000 b/day 335 400 - 500 million Active 
Source: US Energy Information  Agency and Archives of  Offshore,  World 
Oil, Oil and Gas Journal. 
7"4.7 Milyar Dolarlık İmza", Hürriyet,  19 November 1999 and L. Weymouth 
"Turkey's Pipeline Provocation", Washington  Post,  24 November 1999, p. 
A 23. 
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This project has advantages, which may promote the interests 
of  the investors. According to the Turkish side, the port of  Ceyhan 
was the best alternative in order to reach to the world markets. This 
line would a!low AIOC to seli the Caspian hydrocarbons in 
Mediterranean region, which corresponded to a very huge market. In 
addition, this line would not suffer  from  the negative aspects of  the 
port of  Novorosiisk such as the weather conditions, which impeded 
lodging during winter. The oil transportation through Bosphorus 
could be realized by tankers, which had 150.000 DWT of  capacity. 
The tankers, used in the transportation of  oil from  Ceyhan would be 
about 300.000 DWT. 
Nevertheless, the Baku-Ceyhan line had many economic 
disadvantages such as the high costs and the gap betvveen the demand 
and supply. According to AIOC, the cost of  the construction of  a 
pipeline (which has a capacity of  50 million tons per annum) betvveen 
Baku and Ceyhan is 2.9 billion $. Initially, AIOC follovved  policies 
by referring  to the strategic aspects of  this project. In 1999, the 
consortium increased the operational capabilities of  BP-AMOCO 
which started to analyze the cost and profits  instead of  referring  to the 
long term strategic concerns. As a matter of  fact,  BP, Statoil, Exxon, 
Unocal and Lukoil preferred  the options of  Novorossiisk, Supsa and 
Iran because of  the low transaction costs. According to AIOC 
estimates, Baku-Novorossiisk line could be constructed for  2 billion 
$, the Baku-Supsa for  about 1.5 billion $. 
The consortium started to transport the early oil through the 
existing lines tovvards Novorossiisk and Supsa starting at 1997.8 First 
of  ali, AIOC developed new projects in order to transport the early oil 
of  Azerbaijan such as the project of  Baku-Novorosiisk (Azerbaijan-
Russia) which has been initiated in 1997. In addition to this northern 
route, AIOC completed the pipeline of  Baku-Supsa (Azerbaijan-
Georgia) on western route. These two routes had a total capacity of 
235,000 barrels per day. The ethnic conflicts  and political instability 
made the construction of  another pipeline necessary. The bypass of 
Chechnia was completed in 2000. This line was connected to 
Mahachkala port of  the Caspian Sea (Russia) by railroad 
8T. Adams and G. Rich, "Great Power Politics and the Azerbaijan Oil 
Pipeline: An Update", Special  Policy  Forum  Report  of  the Washington 
Institute  for  Near  East  Policy,  24 February 1997. 
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transportation. Consequently, the total amount of  alternative ways of 
oil transportation reached 500,000 barrels per day in 2000. 
Consequently, the gap between the demand and the supply became 
the most critical issue about the Baku-Ceyhan project. Baku-Ceyhan 
line needs 50 million tons of  oil per annum to be feasible.  In 2000 it 
became evident that Azerbaijan would be able to supply 25 million 
tons of  oil per annum at least for  the next ten years. There are two 
consequences of  the incompatibility betvveen the demand and the 
supply. First of  ali, AIOC and Azerbaijan have to convince 
Kazakhstan to supply 20 million tons of  oil per annum to the Baku-
Ceyhan line. Secondly, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, necessitates 
the evolution of  an alternative transportation through the Caspian Sea 
for  the transportation of  Kazakh oil to Azerbaijan. That is to say, 
Baku-Ceyhan and trans-Caspian pipelines seem to be complementary 
projects unless new oil fields  are discovered in Azerbaijan. 
As an ansvver to AIOC's demand, Kazakhstan told that it could 
offer  400,000 barrels per day to Baku-Ceyhan if  the production of 
OKIOC and other projects increase in short term of  5 years. 
Nevertheless, the proven reserves in 2000 indicated that Kazakhstan 
vvould not be able to supply the need of  Baku-Ceyhan for  the next 10-
15 years.9 First of  ali, Kazakhstan has already started to transport oil 
via Novorossiisk.10 The Caspian Pipeline Consortium has already 
involved in the construction of  a pipeline between Tengiz and 
Novorossiisk. "The %30 of  the CPC line has been completed at that 
time and the storage tanks were being constructed at Novorossiisk."11 
Above ali, Kazakhstan guaranteed the throughput of  this pipeline, 
vvhich had a capacity of  26 million tons of  oil per annum. In addition 
the CPC had declared its intention to double the capacity of  this line 
by reaching 70 million tons of  oil per annum in the near future.  These 
lines were exceeding the total production capacities of  Tengiz (10.5 
million tons per annum) and Karachaganak (3.5 million tons per 
annum). That is to say Kazakhstan had no difficulties  about 
transporting its oil by using the ports of  Novorossisk and Supsa. In 
2001 representatives of  Chevron and Kazakoil confirmed  that the first 
9V. Fedetov, "Interview about CPC", Russian Petroleum  Investor, 
December 1998-January 1999. 
10F. Tınç, "Yazdım Ya", Hürriyet,  1 May 2000, p. 28. 
n"Tekfen  Rakip Boru Hattının Kazakistan Bölümünü Aldı", Hürriyet,  30 
March 2000, p. 14. 
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shipments from  the Tengiz field  had reached Novorossiisk via the 
CPC conduit. The consortium began filling  the pipe with Tengiz oil 
on March 26th. The pumping operations were ceased two times 
because of  the difficulties  such as the acquirement of  customs 
clearance for  the shipments of  oil across the Russian-Kazakhstani 
border. Nevertheless, Kremlin and the CPC solved the problems by 
an agreement on the regulations of  customs, currency and oil 
quality12 
In addition it should also be mentioned that there were also 
other alternatives considered by Kazakhstan. The Transneft  company 
of  Russia completed the additional pipeline of  312 km. on April 29th 
2000. The construction of  this pipeline allowed the transportation of 
18 million tons of  oil per annum from  the Caspian region to 
Novorossiisk.13 AmocoEurasiaKazakhstan started to transport the 
Kazakh Oil from  the port of  Aktau to Baku by 10 ships each of  which 
had a capacity of  20 thousand tons.14 Kazakhstan and Russia involved 
in the innovation of  the existing line between Atyrau and Şamara in 
order to increase the capacity to 15.5 million tons per annum. The 
Caspian TransCo started to use railway transportation betvveen Baku 
and Batum. The Tengizchevroil started to transport the Tengiz oil to 
the ports of  Azerbaijan by the tankers, which pass through the 
Caspian Sea. The oil is carried to the Dubendi port of  Azerbaijan by 
ships. From Dubendi the oil is transported to Georgia by using 
railroads and renovated Khasuri-Batumi oil pipeline. 70.000 barrels 
per day of  oil are being transported through this route. In addition 
Kazakhstan exports small amounts of  oil to Russia and China through 
railroad transportation. Ali of  these projects of  Kazakhstan did not 
leave any surplus for  AIOC's Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project. Indeed, 
AIOC currently uses Supsa and Novorossiisk for  the transportation of 
early oil and is not dependent on the construction of  Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline by holding to increase the capacity of  this route by additional 
pipelines.15 
12"First shipments of  Tengiz oil arrive in Novorossiisk via CPC pipeline", 
FSU  Oil  and Gas Monitor,  21 August 2001, p. 4. 
13"Rusya'dan Karsı Hamle", Hürriyet,  30 April 2000, p. 30. 
14The transportation of  25 million tons of  oil per annum will cost 500 million 
$ through this system. M. Akgün, "Hazar'in Statüsü", Yeni  Yüzyıl,  09 July 
1998. 
15"Baku-Ceyhan'a Doping", Yeni  Binyıl,  15 August 2000, p. 9. 
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What can be suggested with no doubt is the fact  that the roles 
of  Novorossiisk and Supsa are simultaneously increasing. The 
increasing role of  Novorossiisk offers  advantages to Russia. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of  the rising significance  of  Supsa are 
not very clear. Georgia considers the projects that pass through his 
lands as an opportunity to make fortune.  Within this context, Georgia 
not only asks for  high transportation tariffs  but also does not 
guarantee the security of  the pipelines going towards Turkey, such as 
the lines of  Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Trans-Caspian and Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum. Knowing the significance  of  Supsa, Russia uses its political 
and military influence  in order to force  Georgia to follow  policies, 
which are compatible with her interests.16 
Both Russia and the petroleum companies underline that the 
technological innovations will solve the problems about storage and 
loading from  Supsa and Novorossiisk. In addition to this, they offer 
solutions for  the negative consequences of  tanker transportation 
which tend to increase. Currently, 50 million tons of  oil is transported 
from  Novorossiisk to Mediterranean by passing through the 
Bosphorus. The pipeline of  Tengiz-Novorossiisk will add 67 million 
tons of  oil to the current figüre.  Russia suggests that 117 million tons 
of  oil can not be considered as a threat to the security of  Bosphorus.17 
Similarly, Chevron suggests that the oil will be transported by the 
tankers which are bigger and safer.  Within this sense, Chevron 
emphasizes that the Turkish straits will not be jeopardized by the 
tanker transportation.18 If  the current trend continues, 2.5 million 
barrels of  oil will pass through the Turkish straits in one day in 2010. 
This is ten times more than the actual transportation. 
The cost/profit  analysis of  multinationals, the advantages 
offered  by existing pipelines and the political influence  of  Russia 
explicitly made this country an indispensable associate in terms of  oil 
transportation. In addition to Russia, Iran is also becoming very active 
in oil transportation by the virtue of  similar reasons which increased 
16S. Kohen, "Oyun İçinde Oyun", Milliyet,  1 March 2001, p. 22. 
Hacıoğlu, "Rusların Pişkinliği Biz Herşeyi Hesapladık Boğazlara Bir 
Şey Olmaz", Hürriyet,  30 March 2001. 
18"TPAO: Facia Unutulmadı", Hürriyet,  21 June 2001, p. 12. 
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its significance  despite the US sanctions. At first,  the Iranian option, 
vvhich seemed to be very convenient for  the transportation of  oil from 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan with low transaction costs, 
was jeopardized by the US sanctions.19 The multinationals were 
expecting to use the Iranian option rather than to construct the Baku-
Ceyhan line. "The Oil companies retarded the vitalization of  the 
Baku-Ceyhan project in order to wait until the relations between the 
US and Iran become normal."20 Nevertheless, there were significant 
issues (the Azeri population in northern Iran, the status of  the Caspian 
and the Islamic regime of  Iran) vvhich obscured the vitalization of 
giant projects between Azerbaijan and Iran.21 Indeed, the Baku-
Ceyhan project outdated the big projects that could be vitalized 
commonly by Azerbaijan and Iran. 
Meanwhile, it became evident that Iran was a very good option 
for  Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan who might prefer  to supply the 
domestic demand of  northern Iran in exchange for  the same amount 
of  oil at the ports of  Gulf.  In February 1998, 50,000 barrels per day 
(barrel per day) have been supplied to the swap line of  Neka-Rey 
from  the ports of  Aktau (Kazakhstan) and Turkmenbashi 
(Türkmenistan).22 The capacity of  the swap line of  Neka-Rey will be 
about 315,000 barrels per day in the near future.  It will be possible to 
increase this capacity to 425,000 barrels per day by the amelioration 
of  the existing pipeline. Furthermore the Iranian network may become 
available for  the swap of  700.000 barrels per day by the addition of 
follovving  three new routes. The first  route will be vitalized by the 
connection of  the port of  Anzali (southwestern coast of  the Caspian 
Sea) to the pipeline of  Tebriz-Ray through a trunk line. Starting at the 
port of  Noshahr (north of  Tehran), the second route will follow  a 
similar line. The third route will become vitalized by the conversion 
of  an existing pipeline from  Atara (located on the coast at the 
19Commission des Affaires  Economiques, Mission  effectuee  au Kazakhstan, 
en Ouzbekistan  et au Türkmenistan,  Rapport D'information,  No. 412, 
1997-1998. 
20E. Unur, "Baku Ceyhan Projesine Farklı Bir Bakış", Star,  27 November 
1999. 
2'The Azeri population in Iran is a source of  fear  for  the Iranian government, 
despite there are Azeri origins in most of  the strategic positions. 
22N. Ghorban, "Neka-Rey Pipeline: Boosting Economic Integration of 
Caspian States", Economic Magazine:  Iran  Today,  May-June 1998. 
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Azerbaijan border) to the Tebriz refinery.23  As a result, it is now 
clear that Iran offers  significant  advantages to its Caspian neighbors 
and multinationals. This is why multinationals such as ExxonMobil 
and ChevronTexaco involved in illegal svvapping with Iran despite 
Mobil's being charged with illegal activities that have been carried 
out commonly with Iran between 1999 and 2001.24 As a matter of 
fact,  it may be concluded that Iran is a rising power which tends to 
reconstruct its relations in the international arena by cooperating with 
American companies in the Caspian region. 
Gas Transportation 
Gazprom's existing pipeline with an annual capacity of  3.5 Tef 
allows Russia to dominate the gas flow  Türkmenistan tovvards other 
members of  CIS as well as European countries. Consequently, 
Türkmenistan can not seli his gas at the world markets because of  the 
absence of  transportation facilities  to the world markets. 
Türkmenistan needs to refer  to Russia and Iran in order to reach 
World markets. 
After  gaining independence, Türkmenistan has faced  with a 
dilemma. On the one hand, Türkmenistan wanted to decrease his 
commercial relations with Russia which were not very profitable. 
Nevertheless, Türkmenistan could not replace Russia with other 
partners because of  the absence of  alternative transportation systems. 
On the other hand, Türkmenistan wanted to develop his commercial 
relations with Iran. Nevertheless, the attitude of  the US against Iran 
impeded the attempt of  Türkmenistan to increase his exportation 
23It should be also mentioned that the high sulfur,  mercaptan and the salt of 
the Kazakh oil can not be processed in the refıneries  of  Iran. Nevertheless, 
Iran is upgrading the refineries  of  Rey and Tebriz in order to process 
337.000 barrels per day of  Kazakh oil. Iran may also increase the 
capacities of  the refıneries  in Isfahan  and Arak. Consequently, the Iranian 
route seems to be convenient for  the oil of  the Kashagan fıeld.  For the 
details of  the attitude of  Iran See, D. E. Gaddy, "Iran expands Middle East 
influence  into Caspian Sea", The  Oil  and Gas Journal,  5 March 2001. 
24S. M. Hersh, "The price of  oil - What was Mobil up in Kazakhstan and 
Russia?" The  New  Yorker,  9 July 2001. 
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through Iran.25 
Türkmenistan's relation with Russia is characterized by clash 
of  interests shaped along pricing, transportation tariffs  and payment 
problems. Gazprom, who buys most of  the gas of  Türkmenistan, does 
not regularly pay his debts because of  the financial  problems of 
countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and even Russia. In addition, 
Gazprom makes payments in ruble or exchange of  goods in spite of 
the fact  that he selis the gas on the basis of  dollars."26 Türkmenistan 
became very reluctant about selling gas via Gazprom because of  the 
low prices and payment problems. Consequently, Türkmenistan 
started to negotiate with other actors (mainly with foreign  companies, 
the US and Turkey) in order to decrease his dependence on Russia by 
creating alternative ways of  transportation. Within this sense, the 
project of  Trans-Caspian was very attractive for  Türkmenistan in 
order to seli its gas to Turkey and even to Europe at good prices with 
no payment problems. The US and Turkey was supporting 
Türkmenistan for  the vitalization of  this project. 
Table 2- Transportation Projects for  Caspian Gas 
Name of  the Project Route Capacity Length (km) Investment Status 
Neka-Teheran Oil Swap 
line 
Iranian Port of  Neka -
Teheran 
370000 
b/day 335 
400 - 500 
million Active 
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Azerbaijan-Turkey 175-565 bcf 280 
682-782 
million Feasibility 
Trans-Caspian 
(Baku-Ceyhan) 
Kazakhstan-Azerbaijan-
Turkey Feasibility 
Trans-Caspian 
(Turkmenbashi-
Erzurum) 
Turkmenistan-
Azerbaijan-Erzurum 1.1 Tef 1696 2-3 billion Feasibility 
Central Asia-Russia-
Europe 
Turkmenistan-
Kazakhstan-Russia 3.5 Tef 
development 
of  existing 
routes 
Trans-Caspian (Baku-
Ceyhan) 
Kazakhstan-Azerbaij an-
Turkey 
feasibility 
1998 
Source: US Energy Information  Agency and Archives of  Offshore,  World 
Oil, Oil and Gas Journal. 
25For instance Türkmenistan had to suspend the natural gas agreement vvith 
Iran by the pressure of  the US. See, "L. Sarıibrahimoglu, "Kafkas  Boru 
Hattı Tehlikede", Yeni  Binyıl,  24 May 2000, p. 17. 
26S. Ergin, 'Türkiye Doğalgazın Vanası Olursa", Hürriyet,  12 November 
1999. 
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Between 1996 and 1998, Türkmenistan occasionally decreased 
the flow  of  gas to Russia because of  payment problems.27 In 1998, the 
relations betvveen Türkmenistan and Russia worsened, when 
Türkmenistan started to bum the natural gas instead of  sending it to 
Russia.28 Türkmenistan was limiting his commercial relations with 
Russia by hoping to seli his gas to Turkey and Europe. Nevertheless, 
the developments in the project of  Blue Stream, the discovery of 
natural gas in Azerbaijan, the natural gas agreement between Turkey 
and Iran, and the unstable policies of  the US and Turkey forced 
Türkmenistan to re-consider Russia (and Iran) as significant  partners. 
In order to benefit  from  the grovving demand of  Turkey, Russia 
offered  an alternative project which was named as the Blue Stream 
(Goluboi  Potok).  Russia and Turkey signed this project in 1997. The 
project was ratified  by Russia in 1999. According to the project the 
pipeline would take place between the compressor station of 
Izobilnoye (Russia) and Ankara (Turkey). Gazprom had already built 
a pipeline betvveen Izobilnoye and Dzhugba (A Russian city near 
Tuapse). The pipeline of  400 km. between Dzhugba and Samsun (a 
city at the northern coast of  Turkey) vvould be constructed under the 
sea by ENİ and Gazprom. Botas vvould complete the line betvveen 
Samsun and Ankara)29 
The developments indicated that the Blue-Stream project 
excluded the trans-Caspian project by deeply hampering Turkey's 
relations with Türkmenistan. At the beginning of  2000 it became 
clear that Turkey vvas committed to buy natural gas not only from 
Russia but also from  Iran. Turkey would buy about 16 billion cubic 
meter of  natural gas from  Russia and 3 billion cubic meter of  gas 
from  Iran (maximum 10 billion cubic meters).30 Since then 
27The relationship betvveen Gazprom and Türkmenistan leads to drastic 
consequences for  other countries, which buy gas from  Gazprom. For 
instance, Itera decreased the flow  of  gas betvveen Türkmenistan and 
Ukraine from  80 million cubic meters per day to 50 million cubic meters 
per day because of  the payment problems of  Ukraine. See, Kommersant 
(In Russian), 16 August 2001. 
28F. Tine, "Hazar Projeleri Delik Deşik" Hürriyet,  27 February 2000, p. 22. 
29"Putin Signs document on Blue Stream Project", FSU  Oil  and Gas 
Monitor,  7 September 1999, p. 7. 
30İ. Türkmen,"Enerji Politikası", Hürriyet,  11 July 2000, p. 24. 
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construction of  Blue Stream gained momentum. In early 2002, 
Turkey started to buy gas from  Iran despite there were claims that the 
price was two times more expensive than the Türkmen gas.31 
The discovery of  natural gas in Azerbaijan can be pointed out 
as another significant  factor,  which changed the characteristics of  the 
commercial relations between Azerbaijan, Türkmenistan, Russia, Iran 
and Turkey. "BP Amoco discovered rich natural gas reserves in the 
Shahdeniz region of  Azerbaijan. Since then Azerbaijan and 
Türkmenistan became competitors concerning the Turkish and 
European markets."32 In addition to Russia and Iran, Turkey signed 
an agreement of  natural gas with Azerbaijan too. "Starting at 2004 
Turkey will buy 2 billion cubic meter of  natural gas from  the fields  of 
Shahdeniz. In 2006 the natural gas flow  to Turkey will be about 6.6 
billion cubic meters. If  Turkey and Azerbaijan agree the gas trade 
between these countries will increase to 15-20 billion cubic meters in 
2008."33 The consortium started to construct the stage 1 of  the field 
development studies in 2002.34 In 2003 a vvorking group started to 
install the pipelines under the Caspian Sea.35 Recently Greece 
negotiated with Azerbaijan in order to export gas through for  its 
domestic usage as well as for  transporting towards European 
markets.36 Turkey's natural gas agreements with Russia, Iran and 
Azerbaijan changed its relations with Türkmenistan. Nevertheless a 
part from  these agreements Turkey's approach and inconsistent 
policies changed Türkmenistan's policies about Trans-Caspian 
pipelines. For Turkey agreements with Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan 
did not mean more than diversification  of  energy supply. 
Nevertheless developments created vital consequences in terms of 
Türkmenistan's relations not only with Turkey and Azerbaijan but 
31"Iran'ın Pahalı Doğalgazına Gecikmeli Tören", Hürriyet,  23 January 2002, 
p. 11. 
32L. Sarıibrahimoglu, "Kafkas  Boru Hattı Tehlikede", Yeni  Binyıl,  24 May 
2000, p. 17. 
33F. Arsan, "Interview with Haydar Aliyev", Sabah, 22 March 2001. 
34"Contract Award for  the Shah Deniz Field Stage 1 Development in the 
Caspian Sea", Business Wire,  7 July 2003. 
35"J. Ray McDermott to install Shah Deniz Subsea Pipelines", Business 
Wire,  18 July 2003. 
36"Greece to Import Natural Gas from  Azerbaijan", Europe Energy, 23 April 
2003. 
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also with Russia and Iran. 
Soon after  the ratification  of  the PSA of  Shah Deniz 
consortium, Azerbaijan started to use the project of  Baku-Erzurum as 
a bargaining tool against Türkmenistan by declaring that it vvould 
allow the transit of  the trans-Caspian line through his lands under the 
condition of  using the 50% of  this line. "Azerbaijan vvanted to use 
half  of  the capacity of  the trans-Caspian line in order to seli its natural 
gas (15 billion cubic meters) to Turkey. Nevertheless, Türkmenistan 
did not want to share this line with Azerbaijan under the actual 
conditions."37 
Türkmenistan decided to seli its gas to Iran instead of  sharing 
the pipeline with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the US forced 
Türkmenistan to suspend his agreement with Iran. Türkmenistan 
demanded financial  support (about 300-500 million dollars) by 
emphasizing that it was becoming dependent on Azerbaijan because 
of  abandoning the agreement with Iran. The US offered  an Eximbank 
credit for  the agricultural sector, which would be refused  by 
Turkmenbashi because of  the unfavorable  conditions. "In order to 
convince Türkmenistan about the route of  Trans-Caspian, Turkey 
disclaimed the debt of  Türkmenistan to Turkish Eximbank worth of 
25 million dollars"38 Nevertheless, the attempt of  Turkey was not 
satisfactory  for  Turkmenbashi, who has already become doubtful 
about the attitudes of  Turkey and the US.39 
Turkmenbashi asked the consortium to finance  the first  phase 
of  the line. In addition, Türkmenistan vvanted to restrict the flow  of 
Azeri gas with 15%. The conditions of  Türkmenistan were not 
attractive for  the members of  the consortium. (General Electric, 
37E. Güven, "Türkmenbası Deyip Geçmeyin", Radikal,  26 March 2000. 
38L. Sarıibrahimoglu, "Kafkas  Boru Hatti Tehlikede", Yeni  Binyıl,  24 May 
2000, p. 17. 
39We should also mention that Clinton and Gore have supported projects 
such as Baku-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian in order to decrease the powers of 
Russia and Iran. The Bush administration may allovv the development of 
commercial relations with Iran. In addition, the American companies want 
to increase in commercial relations with Russia and Iran because of 
economic concerns. See, S. Kohen, "Büyük Oyun Tartışması", Milliyet,  31 
August 2000. 
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Bechtel and Shell)40 Consequently, Türkmenistan started negotiations 
with Russia and Iran. In December 2000, Türkmenistan accepted to 
give 20 billion cubic meter of  natural gas to Russia. ('The demand of 
Russia from  Türkmenistan is about 120 billion cubic meters)41 This 
was exactly reconstruction of  Türkmenistan's relations with Russia 
which has been suspended since 1998 when Türkmenistan started to 
bum the gas rather than sending to Russia. "On 10 May 2000 Putin 
convinced Turkmenbashi to increase the flow  of  natural gas to Russia 
10 billion cubic meter every year. This agreement shaped the 
relations betvveen Türkmenistan, Russia and Turkey concerning the 
commerce of  natural gas. That is to say, this agreement made the 
Trans-Caspian project unnecessary."42 
In addition, Russia wants to increase the capacity of  the 
existing line betvveen Türkmenistan and Georgia. This line will be 
prolonged about 60 km. Russia will supply gas to Turkey through 
Blue Stream and through this line by transporting the Türkmen gas.43 
"According to this scheme Russia would be making good profits  by 
selling gas to Turkey at 116 dollars for  1 thousand cubic meters 
which it was buying from  Türkmenistan at 36 dollars."44 In February 
2003, Turkey started to buy natural gas from  Russia according to the 
Blue Stream Agreement. Soon after  the first  delivery of  gas it would 
40D. Zeyrek, "Doğalgaz Muamması", Radikal,  30 March 2000, p. 11. 
4IM. Sarıkaya, "Ersümer: Boru Hatlarında Problem Yok", Hürriyet,  23 May 
2000, p. 24. 
42The American PSG who assumes the leadership of  the consortium for  the 
transportation of  the Türkmen gas through Caspian is constituted by two 
companies. General Electric Capital is the fınancial  supporter. Bechtel is 
responsible for  the construction phase. General Electric Capital abandoned 
the consortium by claiming that the current developments impede the 
vitalization of  this project. Bechtel will continue to work with Shell. Shell 
declared that his intention about vitalization of  this pipeline stili perpetuate. 
The agreement between Türkmenistan and Russia about increasing the flovv 
of  gas to Russia jeopardizes the projects of  trans-Caspian and Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan. The consortiums emphasize that these projects are feasible  so far 
as they are constructed simultaneously. Considering the current difficulties 
about these projects, AIOC wants to increase the capacity of  Supsa. See, F. 
Tınç, "Kim Kaybediyor", Hürriyet,  28 February 2000, p. 22. and S. 
Yeşilmen and Z. Baran, "Amerika Havlu Attı" Sabah, 29 June 2000. 
43S. Kohen, "Oyun İçinde Oyun", Milliyet,  1 March 2001, p. 22. 
44The  Wall  street  Journal,  23 February 2000. 
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be explicated that the agreement was completely hampering Turkey's 
national interests not only because of  high costs but also because of 
the intermediate agents such as Turusgaz and Itera. Indeed, many 
Turkish officials  would be accused of  fraud  and charged because of 
imposing economic burden upon Turkey for  personal interests. 
Turkey's take or pay commitment impeded its initiatives to reshape 
its natural gas agreements. Above ali, Turkey's reliability vis-â-vis 
Türkmenistan has been completely damaged, which in turn forced  it 
to reconstruct its relations with Russia.45 
In 2003 it became explicit that along with Russia, Iran was 
becoming very active in transportation of  Türkmen gas to world 
markets. Nevertheless, it should also be mentioned that there was an 
explicit intention and a well developed program of  Iran, which led to 
development of  relations with Türkmenistan. There are rich gas 
reserves in the eastern regions of  Türkmenistan. On the contrary, the 
Northeast regions of  Iran need gas. That is to say, Iran wants to 
acquire the gas of  Türkmenistan in order to supply the domestic need 
of  Northern Iran. There are two gas lines between Türkmenistan and 
Iran. The Korpedzhe-Kurtkui line started to operate in 1997 by 
transporting 2 billion cubic million per year. The capacity of  this line 
will be increased to 12 billion cubic million per year until 2006. The 
second gas line, which takes place between Artik and Lotfabad  has 
been vitalized in 2000. Initially, the transportation capacity of  this 
line will be increased to 28 million cubic meters per year until 
2004.46 Besides these pipelines, Iran has suitable ports at the Caspian 
(Anzali, Noshahr and Torkeman) which are convenient for  svvapping. 
In addition to these ports, Iran is building two additional ports near 
Neka (The ports of  Amir Abadport and Fereydoon Kenarto) in order 
to improve the unloading facilities  for  tanker deliveries.47 
Consequently, besides Russia, Türkmenistan started to 
negotiate with Iran in order to swap oil and gas. In the near future 
45"Devleti Çarpan Formül" Sabah, 6 June 2003, p. 7. 
4ĞFor the details of  the attitude of  Iran see, D. E. Gaddy, "Iran expands 
Middle East influence  into Caspian Sea", The  Oil  and Gas Journal,  5 
March 2001. W. James and B. V. Shenoy, "Türkmenistan fumbling 
opportunities afforded  by Trans-Caspian Pipeline", The  Oil  and Gas 
Journal,  28 May 2001. 
47Ibid. 
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(probably until 2005) Türkmenistan may be selling 50 billion cubic 
meter per year of  natural gas to Russia and 13 billion cubic meter per 
year to Iran.48 Having changed his mind about constructing a gas 
pipeline betvveen Türkmenistan and Turkey, Turkmenbashi would 
criticize Turkey's gas policy by emphasizing that Russia and Iran 
were paying 45 and 30 dollars per thousand cubic meters respectively 
from  Türkmenistan, and selling to Turkey for  110 and 100 dollars per 
thousand cubic meters.49 
Conclusion : What is Left  Other Than Azerbaijan for 
Turkey? 
AKT stumbled between two distinct pipeline policies in the 
aftermath  of  their independence. On the one hand, they aspired to 
cooperate with foreign  actors in order to decrease their dependence 
on Russia. On the other hand, the omnipresence of  Russia and 
inconsistent policies Turkey forced  them to perpetuate their former 
relations. Since 2000, the energy regime of  the Caspian started to 
become more solid. Indeed, the production phase of  the Caspian 
hydrocarbons are currently being dominated by the activities of 
foreign  petroleum companies. The technological inferiority  and 
financial  problems of  Russia appear to be the critical factors,  which 
decreased its efficiency  in the production phase. Nevertheless, Russia 
continues to be a very critical actor, which is being considered as a 
strategic partner because of  the economic feasibility  of  its 
transportation system based on a complex link of  pipelines, railroads, 
rivers, canals and marine facilities.  As a matter of  fact,  the 
significance  of  Novorossiisk and Supsa ports started to increase by 
gaining Russia a strategic advantage. In addition to Russia, Iran's role 
is increasing in transportation phase by the opportunities it offers  to 
AKT and multinationals in terms of  swapping, port facilities  and 
existing pipelines. 
This emerging scene explicitly implies that there are few  rooms 
left  for  Turkey in Caspian energy politics shaped along two projects 
both of  which will be operated with Azerbaijan: AIOC's Baku-
48E. Güven, "Türkmenbaşı Deyip Geçmeyin", Radikal,  26 March 2000. 
49S. Turkmenbashi, "Gazı Bizden Alın", Milliyet,  08 January 2002, p. 14. 
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Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline of  Shah Deniz 
project.50 These projects have two special meanings for  Turkey. 
Economically, Turkey will benefit  from  transportation tariffs  charged 
upon the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline worth of  150 million dollars per 
annum. Meanvvhile, it is explicit that the gas of  Shahdeniz will cost 
cheaper when compared with that of  Blue Stream as well as Iranian 
gas. There is no doubt that Azerbaijan will benefit  from  these 
pipelines by selling its hydrocarbons at market prices with no 
payment delays. Strategically, Azerbaijan will overcome its 
dependence on Russia. With regard to Turkey, these pipelines have a 
further  meaning. Baku-Ceyhan pipeline may help Turkey to 
reconstruct its relations with Kazakhstan, which recently became able 
to provide certain amounts of  oil to this line after  the discovery of 
new reserves in Kashagan and Karachaganak. That is to say, 
Kazakhstan may be involved in this system in the future  by a Trans-
Caspian line or by marine transportation. Similarly the Baku-Erzurum 
gas line should also be considered in terms of  its future  benefits. 
Once this gas pipeline is constructed, then it may be easier to 
convince Turkmenbashi to participate in the construction of  Trans-
Caspian gas line. 
Shortly, despite the incidents until now which did not allow 
Turkey to play a significant  role in transportation of  Caspian 
hydrocarbons to world markets, there are stili some chances in which 
relations with Azerbaijan play the primordial role. Nevertheless, 
Turkey did not interact with AKT, Russia and Iran as much as it 
could have done. Currently, Turkey seems to carry out pipeline 
politics through bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that bilateral projects with Azerbaijan may offer  an 
50Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan entered in a new phase since the general 
elections for  presidency held at 15lh October 2003. The trend indicates that 
Azerbaijan's attitude towards Turkey and pipeline projects will not be 
changed by İlham Aliyev, who won the majority of  the votes against Isa 
Kamber (Müsavat Party) representing the unifıed  opposition. The new 
period imposes Turkey new obligations such as sustaining close relations 
not only with the new government, but also the grovving opposition in 
Azerbaijan. This arises from  the fact  that it is not clear to what extent İlham 
Aliyev's regime will be jeopardized by opposition and external pressures. 
See, "Azerbaycan'da Gergin Seçim", Cumhuriyet,  16 October 2003, p. 10. 
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infrastructure  which may involve Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan if 
and only if  Turkey manages to realize the construction of  Baku-
Ceyhan and Baku-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines simultaneously, 
while not ignoring its relations with Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan and 
Türkmenistan. Until now, Turkey did not manage to implement such 
a consistent policy shaped by a multilateral approach. As a matter of 
fact,  the conclusion is clear: pipeline politics in Caspian necessitates 
a consistent-holistic approach that may not only overcome the 
awkwardness of  Turkey's ongoing energy policies, but also respond 
to the peculiarities related to the interaction among AKT, Russia and 
Iran. Otherwise, Turkey's role in Caspian region is doomed to be 
limited to bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. 
